RIP) have been widely used in the Internet. These protocols are of a destination IP address, the distance (usually in number of vulnerable to a variety of attacks since they were designed hops) and the next hop router in the path to this destination. without security aware. In this paper, we propose a new
To maintain the routing table, each router periodically approach called S-DV to Secure Distance Vector Routing transmits a routing update to each of its neighbor routers, Protocols. The main idea is to designate some trusted routers, containing its shortest distance to each destination. Each which we called S-DV routers, which collaborate in consistency node uses this information advertised by its neighbors to checking of routing update messages. These routers maintain update its own routing table, so that its route for each also a security metric which is used to forward data traffic destination uses as a next hop the neighbor that claimed the through a secure route. Our threats analysis and comparison shortest distance to that destination.
show that S-DV offers a deterministic detection of malicious I . a l l I n t r n e t -b a s e applicationsrelonadependabl routing protocols are poor candidates for fault detection than As all Internet-based applications rely on a dependable link state routing protocols. A major threat they are faced on is packet delivery service provided by the Internet routing that one malicious router can interrupt routing operation by protocols, secure routing protocols become of critical sending erroneous routing update. These erroneous routing importance [23] . Routing protocols have been designed to updates are usually generated from two different entities: dynamically maintain route between any pair of external and internal attackers. External attackers can inject communicating entities in spite of changes in network erroneous routing messages, replay previous routing topology. Consequently routing faults can Jeopardize the messages, or modify a valid routing message. As a result, an reliability of critical applications of the Internet [5] [4] and a injected erroneous routing update would propagate throughout single malicious router can completely disrupt the routing the network, and it might remain in use for arbitrarily long protocols and cause a disaster.
periods of time, thus deceiving more than one router.
Several Distance Vector (DV) routing protocols are used: However, internal attackers can usually cause more severe Routing Information Protocol (RIP) [10, 15] is a popular damages. These are routers that have been trusted in some example of distance vector routing protocols which is widely point of time but are not committed to their initial promises used in IP networks of moderate size. Distance vector routing anymore or have been compromised by external attackers. protocols are also adapted to be used for routing within These routers can also send erroneous routing update to their wireless ad hoc networks. DSDV [21] and AODV [20] are neighbor routers and modify their local view of the network examples of these routing protocols.
topology to isolate them or pass their traffic through special routes. Usually, it is much harder to identify the internal A distance vector routing protocol finds shortest paths attackers, since they alreadyhave some sort of credentials that between nodes in the network through a distributed eeyoyrss implementation of the classical Bellman-Ford algorithm [3] . evrbdtus. Whereas, long distance fraud can avoid traffic and preserve its of routing update messages. This is an alternative mechanism, resources and energy. This is due to the lack of mechanisms less expensive that offers a deterministic detection of distance which provide consistency check of routing update. fraud than the approach proposed in S-RIP [30] . Moreover, S-DV routers use a new metric that we designate by Security
In order to counter these vulnerabilities, it is necessary to Indicator, to prefer a choice of a secure route than a shortest propose a new approach which provides authentication, one which has been subject to frequent attacks. integrity, freshness, authorization and consistency check of a routing update. Current version of RIP [15] uses only a clearThe remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
text password for authenticating peers. This is vulnerable to a Section II presents DV routing protocols vulnerabilities. We traffic analysis. An external entity can sniff the password and review the related work in Section III. We present generality overcome the network. Thereafter, Kayed-MD5 [2] has been and details of our approach in Sections IV and V. Sections VI proposed to replace clear-text password authentication. This discusses threat analysis. We measure the overhead of our mechanism uses a MAC (see section IV.B) to provide approach and we give comparison between S-DV and S-RIP authentication, integrity and freshness of a routing updates. in Section VII. We end up our paper with some conclusions However, a MAC does not provide any guarantee on the in Section VIII.
coherence [27] ). [7, 23, 25] network. It has been noted long ago that abusing routing survey these efforts and give a comparison between them. The protocols may be the easiest way for launching attacks [23] actual works accepted as standards [2, 16, 11] an external entity successfully imitates legitimate router's identity. This can be accomplished using the IP spoofing. An In this paper we focus our study on the approaches attacker impersonates router identity to generate, modify or proposed in the literature that protect Distance Vector routing replay routing messages exchanged between legitimate routers protocols from external and internal attackers. We can classify (routers which belong to this network). This is due to the lack these approaches in two categories: Semantic approaches and of mechanisms which provide authentication, integrity and cryptographic approaches (see Fig. 1 ). [18, 24] use the semantic of the protocols to detect distance fraud.
routing messages anomalies.
S-RIP [30] can prevent from short and long distance fraud Mittal et al. [18] detect faults in a RIP network using using request/reply messages to confirm the consistency of an sensors which are placed on some or all of the links and each advertised route. In S-RIP, a router confirms the consistency sensor is given the whole network topology as well as the of an advertised route with those routers that have propagated positions of all other sensors. A sensor computes all the that route. To support this mechanism, S-RIP adds a next hop possible paths from each router to each subnet by essentially attribute to a routing update exchanged between neighbor running a link state protocol on the manually configured routers. A reputation-based framework is proposed for topology. A sensor then analyzes the routing updates on its determining how many routers should be consulted to flexibly links and the updates' semantics (i.e. distances) are checked balancing security and efficiency. The major drawback of this against the sensor's set of all possible distances. If a distance mechanism is the non deterministic detection of faulty routes.
is not in the legitimate range, an alarm is raised. Otherwise, a
Indeed, a malicious advertised route may be accepted if query is sent to all the sensors along the possible path(s) that routers who forward this route are colluding. In addition to have this distance in order to verify the distance. This has this, S-RIP generates an important overhead due to major drawbacks for practical deployment since it implicitly consistency check massages transmission in the network. requires static network topology, static sensor placements, and All these solutions offer a better security level but they are each sensor has to compute all the possible paths for each expensive in terms of control messages overhead, CPU time in router to each destination. generation and verification of signatures and consumption of RIP with Triangle theorem checking and Probing memory resources in routers. Besides, these approaches do messages (RIP-TIP) [24] uses the routing update to check a not maintain any history of detected malicious routing simple triangle theorem. The theorem states that given a set of updates. In our approach, S-DV routers maintain neighbor 3 nodes in a shortest path protocol, the distance between one routers behavior metric to prefer a choice of a secure route pair of nodes should be always less than the sum of the than a shortest one which has been subject to frequent attacks.
distance of the other two pairs. However, message losses or Moreover, we introduced an efficient Distance Request update message delays may cause a temporary violation of the Distance Reply (DR) mechanism for route consistency triangle theorem. To distinguish temporary delays from faults, checking. Our DR mechanism reduces considerably the probing messages are sent to the destination to verify the number of messages sent in the network to check route suspicious routing update. One disadvantage is that probing consistency compared to S-RIP. Besides, our approach offers messages may be manipulated. A node advertising an invalid a deterministic detection of distance fraud as we will see in the route can convince a receiver that a route is valid by subsequent sections. manipulating the TTL value in a probing message or sending IV. SDV GENERALITY back an ICMP message (port unreachable) on behalf of the destination.
To prevent Distance Vector routing vulnerabilities, we propose a new approach to Secure Distance Vector routing B. Cryptographic approaches protocols (S-DV). Our approach reduces considerably the Several solutions which use cryptographic mechanisms to overhead generated by route consistency checking messages detect malicious routing messages have been proposed in the and is deterministic with respect to malicious routing updates literature. These solutions can be classified in two categories:
detection. The main idea is to designate some trusted routers, public-key approaches and symmetric key approaches.
which we call S-DV routers, which collaborate to provide the consistency checking through our Distance Request and * Definition systems. These solutions require a public key infrastructure PKI [12] which distributes the certificates (a signed document To check if a node is authorized to advertise a route to a which binds the prefix to routers attached to). Among other sub-net (prefix) which claims to be directly attached to, we solutions using this concept, one can cite: Address Attestation suppose that: in S-BGP [14] and the certificates of authorization in soBGP * (A3). Every node of the network knows which prefixes are [29] . In RIP [15] , prefix impersonation occurs when a node v, directly attached to every one ofits neighbor nodes. receives from its neighbor vj an advertised route to a prefix with a distance equal to zero, vi checks if the announced Such knowledge, router-prefix mapping, are securely prefix belongs to this neighbor or not using router-prefix distributed to each uteter, e.g., it can be pre-configured on knowledge (A3). Depending on this verification, it decides each router since in an Autonomous System (AS) network whether to accept or reject the advertised route.
configurations are administratively controlled by a single authority. We note that this assumption is less strong than S-D. DR mechanism to prevent distancefraud RIP [30] In addition to the previous information, every S-DV node, route to another, we need some mechanism of comparison maintains also: between routes. This allows S-DV nodes to choose the better route in term of security. Generally, this route has low attacks * A shared secret key with every other S-Dy node (A2), probability, low frequency of non authentic routing updates and a sequence number used in the authentication and low inconsistence route frequency. We propose to prefer a scheme ofDR messages.
choice of a route where the multiplication of these three * A neighbor The number of consistent routing than the current distance to a destination. update received from the neighbor Vj 3. vi receives a route advertisement with longer distance coh(vi, vj)
The number of non consistent routing and better security Indicator than the current distance to update received from the neighbor Vj a destination. In this case, it performs additional validations such as: route self-consistency, Router/Prefix authentication and C. Security Indicator consistency check: The Security Indicator is used as a metric to measure the 1) Self-consistency check security level associated to a route with a neighbor node vj as a
The fist treatment to perform is to check the selfnext hop. For that, every S-DV node vi uses its neighbor (vi, v1) advertise a route back to vi from which it learns that route. Otherwise, the problem of counting to infinity occurs. Although RIP detects this problem and proposes split horizon with trigged update to solve it, a all S-DV routers and shares a secret key with each of misbehaving node may not follow the rule and them (cf. assumption A2).
intentionally creates the problem. in what related to routing information and DR messages. It origin authentication scheme described in section IV.B. We may generate faulty information with respect to one or more specified our scheme using HLPSL (High Level Protocol fields that constitute the routing information. It may also block Specification Language) [19] with data origin authentication or modify received DR messages. We have already discussed as a security objective. In appendix A, we provide the whole the case of faulty prefix and distance announcements (cf.
HLPSL specification of our authentication scheme. AVISPA sections IV.C and IV.D). tool confirmed that the specified protocol is safe.
In what follows, we discuss the case of faulty announcement of the predecessor, and the modification and VII. OVERHEAD EVALUATIONAND COMPARISON suppression of DR messages. We demonstrate that our
In this section, we underline the advantages of our solution resists to this kind of active attacks. Furthermore, we approach S-DV compared to S-RIP [30] by evaluating the verify that our cryptographic mechanisms used to guarantee number of generated messages in each approach. We consider data origin authentication for DR exchanges and route the following parameters:
advertisements do not have security holes. In a routing protocol, a route advertisement propagates from node to node until it reaches all the nodes in the network. In S-RIP all the nodes are affected by the checking of route consistency, where in our approach only the S-DV nodes are affected by the checking of route consistency. Thus, in a V0 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 network containing S S-DV nodes among n nodes, we have ysRjp (dest)= n-I and YSDV (dest)=S-1, because the first node in the traversed path by this route doesn't check the consistency Figure 3 Number of messages generated by the consistencycheck mechanism of this route. There is neither next hop nor predecessor for this of one route in S-RIP route.
Note that in S-RIP, as shown in figure (Fig. 3) , a node vo From 0(dest) and y(dest) we deduce Vf(dest) which is checks the route consistency by asking recursively all the equal to the multiplication of these two parameters. This last intermediate nodes which have forwarded the route parameter measures the induced overhead by each approach advertisement. S-RIP proposes also a new mechanism based for the checking of route consistency. This happens especially on the reputation of nodes to determine the number of nodes when the network nodes or S-DV nodes set the routes in their which must be asked, to ensure that the route advertisement is routing tables for the first time.
correct. This mechanism reduces the number of required Table III lists the amount of messages that is saved in Snodes to be asked but it makes non deterministic detection of DV in comparison to S-RIP: malicious (erroneous) routing updates. In what follows, we consider the deterministic case, i.e., the case where the checking of route consistency requires the asking of all Table III , we deduce that with S-DV we save:
1. £f(f+1) transmissions of messages induced by a node Distance Request for the checking of route consistency, 2. n-S nodes' affectation by the checking of route consistency, then less memory resources and CPU time used by the whole network nodes. We have seen through the comparison between S-DV and S-RIP the very important contribution introduced by our Figure. 4 Number of messages generated by the consistency check mechanism approach. Besides, we note that our approach is very adapted of one route in S-DV for large scale networks, because its contribution is in direct relation with £ the average length of a route. In fact, with
In our approach, as shown in figure (Fig. 4) 
